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This paper studies optimal monetary policy responses to country-specific shocks in a simple
two-country new open macroeconomic model that features sticky-price and local-currency
pricing. Technology shocks in the home country are allowed to diffuse to the foreign country
with a one-period lag, and vice versa. We find, even in the presence of price-stickiness and
local-currency pricing, real shocks may generate market overreaction, to which central banks
respond by implementing contractionary monetary policy. This is exactly opposite to the
Devereux and Engel’s (2003) prediction and many other’s. However, it may be consistent
with empirical evidence of rising nominal interest rates during economic boom.
I am grateful to Bill Dupor, Paul Evans, Hu McCulloch, and Masao Ogaki for helpful comments. All remaining errors are my
own.
Citation: Kim, Hyeongwoo, (2008) "Country-specific shocks and optimal monetary policy." Economics Bulletin, Vol. 5, No. 23
pp. 1-9
Submitted: June 3, 2008.  Accepted: September 17, 2008.
URL: http://economicsbulletin.vanderbilt.edu/2008/volume5/EB-08E50017A.pdf1 Introduction
This paper studies optimal monetary policy responses to country-speciﬁc productivity shocks
when prices are pre-set in local currency (local-currency pricing or LCP). In a similar frame-
work, Devereux and Engel (2003) show that welfare-maximizing central banks respond to a
favorable country-speciﬁc shock by implementing expansionary monetary policy. Obstfeld
(2006) and Duarte and Obstfeld (2007) also make qualitatively same predictions1.
With sticky prices, an optimal monetary policy response to a favorable shock needs to
be expansionary so that consumptions fully respond to the shock as in the ﬂexible prices
equilibrium. In the absence of expenditure-switching role for exchange rates (due to LCP),
no change in terms of trade is required so that both countries positively respond to the
shock2.
In aforementioned researches, technology innovations occur only within a country. In-
stead, this paper allows country-speciﬁc shocks to diﬀuse to other countries with a one-period
time lag. In so doing, I show that consumption responses to real shocks can be ampliﬁed,
and central banks may implement contractionary monetary policy in order to neutralize such
market overreaction. Put it diﬀerently, central banks may raise nominal interest rates when
there occurs a positive productivity shock. This outcome is exactly opposite to the Devereux
and Engel’s (2003) and the Obstfeld’s (2006) predictions and many other’s. It should be
noted, however, that the prediction made in this paper may be consistent with empirical
evidence of rising nominal interest rate during economic boom.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the baseline model. In
section 3, I characterize the solution under the ﬂexible prices equilibrium as a benchmark.
Section 4 provides the analytic solution of the main model that features price-stickiness
and local-currency pricing. Section 5 describes the optimal interest rate rule by welfare-
maximizing central banks. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Baseline Model
2.1 Preferences
There are two symmetrical countries, the home and the foreign country. Each country is
populated by a continuum of identical monopolistically competitive producers/consumers,
indexed by h ∈ [0,1] for the home country and f ∈ [0,1] for the foreign country. Each agent
produces a single traded good. They also provide labor in a perfectly competitive domestic
labor market.
1In the Devereux and Engel’s (2003) model, the home and the foreign country identically respond to
a country-speciﬁc shock. However, the Duarte and Obstfeld’s (2007) model predicts a stronger domestic
response to a domestic shock in the presence of nontraded goods. Nonetheless, both countries still positively
respond to favorable technology shocks.
2With full expenditure-switching role (producer’s currency pricing or PCP), an eﬃcient allocation re-
quires a change in relative prices. For instance, the home country needs to respond to a favorable home
shock positively, while the foreign country implements contractionary policy. The resulting terms of trade
deterioration will shift the demand in either country toward the home goods consumption.














, ρ,κ > 0, β ∈ (0,1), (1)
where C is a consumption index, L is labor supply, and κ is a labor disutility parameter.
Following Obstfeld (2006), I don’t explicitly model the demand for money3. The ﬂow budget
constraint that home representative agent faces is the following.




H,t(h) − WTt+1(h) + (1 + Rt+1)WTt(h), (2)
where Pt is the nominal price index of Ct, St is the nominal exchange rate as the home-
currency price of the foreign currency, WTt is the nominal wealth, and Rt+1 is the nominal
ex post return on WTt. We assume that the representative home producer h employs third-
degree price discrimination by setting two diﬀerent prices PH,t and P ∗
H,t in local currency
for the good sold in the home country (YH,t) and in the foreign country (Y ∗
H,t), respectively
(LCP)4.







γγ(1 − γ)1−γ, (3)
where CH,t and CF,t are the consumption sub-indexes for home and foreign goods, respec-
tively. For simplicity, we assume that γ = 1/2, which implies that there is no home bias.


























θ (> 1) is the common constant elasticity of substitution across goods in each sector.
























3Central banks are assumed to adopt interest rate rules so that the money supply adjusts endogenously.
Then, we don’t have to explicitly model the money demand in the utility function (see Woodford 2003). We
also assume that the money demand has a negligible impact on the utility. This assumption is often adopted
even when the real balance appears in the utility function (e.g., Devereux and Engel 2003).
4Under PCP, the agent chooses a single price for the traded good sold in both markets. That is, once the
domestic price PH,t(h) is determined, the foreign price P∗
H,t(h) will be automatically set by PH,t(h)/St.































The foreign representative agent f also solves a similar problem. And foreign prices and
demand functions have isomorphic expressions, denoted by a superscript asterisk (∗).
2.2 Asset Market
We assume consumers in each country have access to a complete set of state-contingent
nominal bonds5. We assume that they trade these bonds before the realization of the state
of the world so that they will equalize the marginal consumption value of one unit of the
nominal bonds across countries for all states of nature. Then, as in Backus and Smith (1993),












for all dates and states.
2.3 Production Technologies
The production functions for each variety of goods are given by,







where L and A denote employment and technology level, respectively.
Letting lower-case letters (excluding interest rates) denote natural logarithms, the tech-
nologies obey the following stochastic processes.








t + ut−1, (12)
where






This is a new feature of this paper. A productivity shock in the home country is allowed to
diﬀuse to the foreign country with a one-period lag, and vice versa. For example, ut−1 will be
fully incorporated to the home productivity (at−1) at time t−1. At time t, it will contribute
to the the home productivity by λut−1 (via λat−1), while it will be fully incorporated to
the foreign productivity (a∗
t) due to technology diﬀusion. Note that ut is an unanticipated
shock to the home country at time t, while all agents can anticipate its impact on the foreign
productivity at time t + 1 with perfect foresight. The foreign productivity shock u∗
t has
similar impacts.
5That is, each bond-holder receives her payoﬀ in monies rather than goods.
32.4 Interest Rate Rules
Following Obstfeld (2006), I assume that the central bank in each country employs the
nominal interest rate as the monetary instrument. That is, central banks adopt the following
interest rate rules,
it = ι + ψpt − α1ut − α2u
∗
t, (13)
for the home country, and
i
∗









for the foreign country, where it and i∗
t denote the nominal interest rates in the home and
the foreign country, respectively6. Central banks are assumed to credibly commit to these
rules with constant values for ψ and α’s.
3 A Benchmark: The Flexible Prices Equilibrium
As Devereux and Engel (2003) show, with LCP, it is possible for central banks to alleviate
distortion7 due to price stickiness when there occurs a country-speciﬁc real shock. Therefore,
it would be useful to analyze the solution under ﬂexible prices as a benchmark case.
With fully ﬂexible prices, ﬁrms set prices by constant markup ( θ
1−θ) pricing over nominal
marginal cost in each period. We assume that labor markets are perfectly competitive so
that nominal marginal costs are Wt




t for the foreign country.













By the price index deﬁnition (6), markup pricing rules, and (15), we can show that equilib-


















That is, as in the Devereux and Engel’s (2003) model, consumptions are perfectly synchro-
nized across countries in the presence of a perfectly integrated ﬁnancial market.
From (12) and (16), consumption innovations in the ﬂexible prices equilibrium are,











That is, consumptions respond identically to a country-speciﬁc productivity shock. It should
be also noted that, under ﬂexible prices, technology diﬀusion has no impact on consumption
6It can be shown that the price level is determinate as long as ψ is strictly positive. See Appendix for
details.
7It should be noted that, with LCP, optimal monetary policy can generate optimal consumption responses
to country-speciﬁc real shocks, whereas optimal consumption levels can be obtained by optimal monetary
policy with PCP.
4in either country8.
4 The Sticky-Price, Local-Currency Pricing Model
We assume that producers set their nominal prices for their goods in local currency one
period in advance. For example, the representative home producer h sets the prices PH,t(h)
and P ∗
H,t(h), at time t−1 using all available information, and maintains them for one period.











subject to the budget constraint (2), the demand equations (8), (9), and the labor demand
function,
Lt(h) =




Then, the ﬁrst order condition with respect to PH,t(h) implies the following pricing equa-














Foreign pricing equations are similarly deﬁned.
It cab be shown that the realized home consumption in the equilibrium can be expressed

























t) + ˜ ∇,
where ˜ ∇ denotes a function of parameters, unconditional moments, and variables dated t−1.
Foreign consumption function can be similarly expressed.
Assuming that policy parameters α’s are all zero as in the ﬂexible prices equilibrium, we,
8This feature is consistent with the work of Barro and King (1984) that shows, with time-separable
preferences, current equilibrium allocations are not aﬀected by expectations about the future. Adding the
risk-sharing condition (10), Devereux and Engel (2007) illustrate a generalized version of this result in an
open economy framework.
5then, obtain the following.


























Compared with (17), equation (22) demonstrates the following interesting results. First,
under the current setup, ut creates two types of distortions, the sticky price eﬀect and
the technology diﬀusion eﬀect. With regard to the sticky price eﬀect, neither country can
generate a full amount of consumption innovation 1
2ρ under the ﬂexible prices equilibrium,




At the same time, ut generates the technology diﬀusion eﬀect at time t. When ut is
realized, agents in both countries know it will diﬀuse to the foreign country, and thus pF,t
will be lowered at time t + 1, and so will pt+1. Anticipating higher ct+1, people will increase
ct right away (consumption smoothing), which is distortionary since A∗
t hasn’t changed yet.
Similar reasoning can be done with respect to u∗
t.
Interestingly, productivity shocks ut and u∗
t may generate market overreaction. Note that
the combined impacts of ut or u∗





1 + ψ − λ

, (23)
which is greater than the consumption response 1
2ρ under the ﬂexible prices equilibrium as
long as ψ > 1−λ
λ . Since λ is a persistent parameter of productivity that is often deemed to
be fairly big, this condition may not be too restrictive.
5 Optimal Interest Rate Rule and Welfare Analysis
We assume that the home central bank maximizes the home representative agent utility











The foreign central bank also solves a similar problem.
It is possible to formally derive the optimal response functions to country-speciﬁc real
shocks (see Appendix). However, a careful inspection of (21) shows that the central banks























6Therefore, given ψ > 0, the optimal interest rate rules are,





t = ι + ψp
∗
t − ¯ α(ψ)(ut + u
∗
t),







is a constant given ψ. Note that the consumption innovations
under the ﬂexible prices equilibrium (17) are recovered with these rules.
One interesting feature of these results is the following. Unlike Devereux and Engel (2003)
and Obstfeld (2006), central banks may implement contractionary monetary policy when
there is a positive productivity shock. This case may arise when the technology diﬀusion
eﬀect is big enough. Recall that, observing a current shock ut at time t, foreign producers
will determine pF,t+1 at a lower level due to technology diﬀusion that will occur at time
t+1, and thus pt+1 will also decline . Assuming that central banks can commit the optimal
policy rules, a strictly positive value of ψ implies lower nominal interest rates at time t + 1.
Furthermore, lower pt+1 will lead to higher expected inﬂation at time t + 1. Hence, real
interest rates at time t + 1 will decrease in both countries. Therefore, expecting a positive
consumption growth owing to lower pt+1 and lower real interest rates, agents will intend to
increase ct at time t. However, such a consumption innovation at time t is distortionary9,
and central banks wish to eliminate it. Note that the technology diﬀusion eﬀect will be
greater the bigger ψ is, since bigger ψ implies that real interest rates will decline more at
time t + 110.
In a nutshell, if central banks commit fairly aggressive responses to prices with ψ > 1−λ
λ ,
markets may overreact, and the central banks may wish to respond to it by implementing
contractionary monetary policies. This result is new11, and I believe this new feature may
be consistent with empirical evidence of rising nominal interest rates during economic boom.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, I develop a sticky-price, local-currency pricing model that features technology
diﬀusion. This model produces quite interesting results. When a central bank commits a
fairly aggressive response to a price level, a favorable country-speciﬁc shock may generate
market overreaction, which requires the central bank to implement contractionary monetary
policy instead of expansionary policy as Devereux and Engel (2003) and many others predict.
My prediction, however, seems to be consistent with empirical evidence of rising nominal
interest rates during economic boom.
9Because technology diﬀusion will occur at time t + 1.
10Higher ψ will also reduce the sticky-price eﬀect. However, it is easy to show that ψ alone cannot
completely remove the sticky-price eﬀect.
11Under LCP, models by Devereux and Engel (2003), Duarte and Obstfeld (2007), and Obstfeld (2006)
predict that central banks implement expansionary monetary policies. It is easy to see that the sticky price
eﬀect alone cannot generate market overreaction.
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